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sessing with an intent to distribute or manufacture, a con-
trolled substance. The statute, as enacted, permits the pros-
ecution of individuals arrested beyond U.S. jurisdiction and 
even within the territorial seas of other States. This provi-
sion is argued to be an impermissible extraterritorial reach 
absent a nexus requirement—showing a connection between 
the drug smuggling activity and the U.S. Recently, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute’s ex-
traterritorial reach and lack of nexus requirement as un-
constitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause and Of-
fenses Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This note explores 
the background and development of the MDLEA and argues 
its unconstitutionality. 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................199 
II. BACKGROUND ...................................................................201 
A. Drug Crisis in the United States ......................................201 
B. The Marijuana on the High Seas Act—A Predecessor 
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, Volume 
53; J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2019, Uni-
versity of Florida. I would like to thank Vincent Halloran for his guidance when 
drafting this Note. I would also like to acknowledge Alexa Garcia, Kristina 
Thoren, and Michelle Stein for their thorough edits and feedback. Lastly, I am 
grateful to Aimee Ferrer for leading me to this topic, and to Professor Elizabeth 
Iglesias and Tracy Dreispul for their insight. 
1 9 7  
198 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
to the MDLEA ................................................................. 203 
C. The MDLEA: A Hawkish Effort to Prevent the 
Importation of Drugs into the U.S. ................................. 206 
III. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH ON 
THE HIGH SEAS ......................................................................................... 207 
A. Setting the Stage with the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea ...................................................... 208 
B. The Five Types of Jurisdiction under Customary 
International Law ............................................................ 209 
i. The Protective Principle Fails to Justify the 
MDLEA’s Extraterritorial Reach on the High Seas  . 210 
ii. Universal Jurisdiction Does Not Apply to Arrests 
Made on the High Seas ............................................. 212 
IV. MURKY WATERS: EXTRA–TERRITORIAL REACH IN 
FOREIGN TERRITORIAL WATERS ........................................................ 212 
A. Latin American Sentiments on U.S. Exercise of Extra– 
Territorial Control .......................................................... 214 
i. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substance—A Case 
Against Prosecuting Conduct Outside Territorial 
Reach ......................................................................... 215 
ii. U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Latin 
American Nations ..................................................... 217 
B. Treatment of MDLEA by Davila–Mendoza and a 
Forecast for Future Decisions on the Extraterritorial 
Reach of the MDLEA in Foreign Territorial Waters ...... 217 
i. The Offences Clause of the Constitution in 
Maritime Law ............................................................ 220 
ii. The MDLEA is not Justified Under the Offences 
Clause of the Constitution ......................................... 222 
C. The Background and Development of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause ........................................................... 224 
i. The Foreign Commerce Clause in General ............... 224 
ii. Interstate Commerce Clause in General.................... 225 
iii. The Extraterritorial Reach of MDLEA is Not 
Justified Under the Foreign Commerce Clause ........ 225 
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 228 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 199 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Exhaustion from sleep deprivation, exacerbated by a lingering 
concern over your health and wellbeing; nausea from the rocking of 
the boat coupled with the stench of human feces and body odor; 
hunger so intense it consumes every waking second of your day; 
anxiety from not knowing whether you will ever see, or let alone 
speak, to your spouse, sibling, child, or mother ever again. This is 
the reality for thousands of Latin Americans who are seized by the 
U.S. Coast Guard every year, and they can endure this agony for 
days, weeks, and even months on end.1 Many of those who find 
themselves in this position are fishermen, who are lured into 
smuggling drugs across seas to provide for their families.2 Often, 
the U.S. Coast Guard will have tracked their every move at sea, 
waiting for a suitable moment to jump in and seize its suspects. 
Such seizures will occur beyond the territory of the U.S. and within 
the jurisdictions of other States or in the high seas, most often in 
the Caribbean and Latin America.3 Thus, the main question pre-
sented here is where should these alleged smugglers be prosecuted? 
In their home States? In the States of their captors? Answering 
these jurisdictional issues requires an examination of U.S. constitu-
tional law and traditional notions of customary international law. 
Ultimately, it will be argued that if prosecutors want to try these 
cases domestically, they must show a sufficient nexus between 
drug smuggling activity and the U.S. 
For guidance, this casenote will evaluate the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction through the lens of the Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act (MDLEA)—a popularly used federal statute for 
prosecuting drug smugglers found outside of U.S. jurisdiction.4  
1 See generally, Seth Freed Wessler, The Coast Guard’s ‘Floating Guant 
namos’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/ 
magazine/the-coast-guards-floating-guantanamos.html. 
2 Id.  
3 Associated Press, Drug smugglers take to the high seas to avoid border 
patrol, N.Y. POST (Feb. 24, 2014, 1:54 PM), https://nypost.com/2014/02/24/ 
drug-smugglers-take-to-the-high-seas-to-avoid-border-patrol/. 
4 See infra note 6. 
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Particularly, this article will observe the maritime drug smuggling 
phenomenon as it occurs mainly in other States’ territorial waters 
as well a brief analysis applied to the high seas.5  
As enacted, the MDLEA prohibits individuals on board a cov-
ered vessel from manufacturing, distributing, or possessing, with an 
intent to distribute or manufacture, a controlled substance.6 A 
“covered vessel” is one that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction.7 Vessels 
subject to jurisdiction of the U.S, include, but are not limited to, 
vessels “without nationality,” and “a vessel in the territorial water of 
a foreign nation if the nation consents to the enforcement of United 
States law by the United States.”8 Additionally, this prohibition 
applies to acts “committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”9 Regarding jurisdiction, the MDLEA asserts that 
anyone violating the statute will be tried “in the district in which 
such offense was committed,” or, if the offense was carried out 
upon the high seas or otherwise outside U.S. jurisdiction, they 
“shall be tried in any district.”10 This final, overarching clause is 
what raises the most concern because the latter proposition activates 
limitless reach for the United States to arrest and prosecute anyone 
they consider to violate the MDLEA.11  
Recently, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case originating 
in the Southern District of Florida held that the MDLEA is un-
constitutional, in part, under the Foreign Commerce Clause.12 The 
holding in United States v. Davila–Mendoza will be at the crux of 
the analysis here, in hopes that the Supreme Court will confront 
this issue and give direct guidance to lower courts.13 Thus, two 
main contentions will be asserted: the MDLEA’s extraterritorial 
reach without consent (1) violates the U.S. Constitution and (2) 
5 High Seas, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com 
/topic/high-seas (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (“High seas, in maritime law, [in-
cludes] all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding the globe that are not part 
of the territorial sea or internal waters of a [S]tate.”). 
6 Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2021). 
7 Id. § 70503(e). 
8 Id. § 70502(1). 
9 Id. § 70502(b). 
10 Id. § 70503(b) (emphases added). 
11 Id. 
12 United States. v. Davila–Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020). 
13 See generally id. 
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offends traditional notions of customary international law on extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Mainly, it will be argued that the MDLEA 
needs to contain a nexus requirement for alleged smugglers found 
in foreign territorial waters to comply with constitutional require-
ments and therefore customary international law. 14 Part II of this 
article will walk through the background of drug abuse in the U.S. 
and the laws enacted to mitigate the issue. Part III will evaluate the 
existing law as it applies specifically to the high seas and provide 
an argument against the MDLEA’s reach of jurisdiction for conduct 
committed in the high seas. Finally, Part IV will delve into Latin 
American Countries’ sentiment, through an examination of treaties, 
that concern the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach on their citizens 
and in their territory. Additionally, Part IV will reveal how the 
MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach in Latin American territorial waters 
is unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce and Offences 
Clauses and offends traditional notions of customary international 
law. 
I I .  BACKGROUND 
A. Drug Crisis in the United States 
Indeed, drug consumption in the U.S. is a problem. Since the 
mid–seventies, the U.S. has seen a dangerous, widespread usage of 
drugs.15 Drug poisoning deaths peaked in 2017 and consistently 
outrank deaths by firearms, car accidents, and homicide. 16 This can 
be attributed largely in part to the booming international drug– 
14 See infra note 79. Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, a showing of a 
nexus between the illegal activity and the U.S. must be demonstrated. As for 
customary international law, some argue that the Protective Principle ought to 
permit Congress to authorize the extraterritorial arrests contemplated by the 
MDLEA. Id. However, the protective principle also carries with it the burden to 
prove the same nexus. Id. 
15 See William H. Latham, United States v. Davis: Extraterritorial Applica-  
tion of U.S. Drug Laws on the High Seas, 16 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
641, 642 (1991). 
16 See 2019 Drug Enforcement Administration National Drug Threat As-
sessment, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. (Dec. 2019). In 2017, about 192 people died 
every single day from drug poisoning. Id. 
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trade which produced over $400 billion in revenue in 2006 alone.17 
The drugs mainly responsible for those deaths include cocaine, 
heroin, and methamphetamine,18 mostly coming from Latin Amer-
ica.19 The most relevant drug, for purposes of maritime drug 
smuggling in Latin America, is cocaine.20 In 2018, global seizures of 
cocaine reached 1,131 tons, the second highest amount that year after 
cannabis.21 Colombia is the leading nation among Latin American 
States, and likely the world, in the cocaine–trafficking industry, 
accounting for ninety–percent of cocaine consumption in the U.S. 
and eighty percent of the global market in 2009.22 Because of the 
concentration of drug–trafficking in this region—or perhaps because 
of the District’s leniency23—almost all cases have been prosecuted 
out of the Southern District of Florida. 24 
As a result, for the past twenty years Congress has sought to 
address the rapidly expanding drug problem through legislation 
seeking to mitigate consumption.25 In fact, before 1981, the “War on 
Drugs” (a term coined by the Nixon Administration) was almost an 
afterthought to the aggregate of federal law–enforcement ef-forts.26 
President Reagan was at the forefront of efforts to expand the reach 
of the drug war by endorsing laws that boost convictions for drug 
consumption.27 For cocaine and marijuana specifically, 
17 Charles R. Fritch, Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: Using International 
Legal Principles to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Illicit Narcotics Trade and 
the Ninth Circuit’s Unnecessary Nexus Requirement, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. 
L. REV. 701 (2009). 
18 U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 16. 
19 Id. at 60 (90% of cocaine comes from Colombia and 6% from Peru; 100% of 
heroin seizures are found to be coming from Latin American States). 
20 See id. Cocaine is the leading drug produced in, and transported from, Latin 
America. 
21 See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2020, U.N. Doc. 
E/20/XI/6 (June 2020). 
22 See PETER CHALK, THE LATIN AMERICAN DRUG TRADE: SCOPE, 
DIMENSIONS, IMPACT, AND RESPONSE (2011). 
23 See Wessler, supra note 1. 
2 4  Id.  
25 See Latham, supra note 15, at 641. 
26 War on Drugs, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com 
/topic/war–on-drugs (last visited Oct. 6, 2021). 
27 Id. (Between 1980 and 1997, incarcerations for nonviolent drug offenses 
rose from 50,000 convictions to 400,000). 
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the U.S. focused on reducing external supply from Latin America 
rather than internal demand from its own citizens.28 Naturally, this 
caused a great deal of legislative and executive attention to be 
placed not only on regulating the territorial seas of the U.S., but 
even the high seas in the Caribbean and Latin America.29 One of 
the initial pieces of legislation to reflect U.S. efforts to mitigate 
drug–trafficking was the Marijuana on the High Seas Act. 30 
B. The Marijuana on the High Seas Act—A Predecessor to the 
MDLEA 
As an initial effort to cease drug flow into the U.S., Congress 
enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA).31 Under the 
MHSA, federal courts had a right to assert subject matter jurisdic-
tion over U.S. nationals, despite location of capture.32 Nor did this 
Act require prosecutors to prove that the drugs were indeed bound 
for distribution in the U.S., only that it was a U.S. national or vessel 
committing the act of transferring the narcotics.33 So, where the 
drug smugglers were not aboard a U.S. vessel or were not U.S. 
nationals, prosecution would still be permitted so long as the 
smugglers were captured on the High Seas34 and it could be shown 
that these foreign nationals had an intent to distribute their con-
trolled substances in the U.S.35 Thus, the nexus requirement makes 
an appearance in drug smuggling cases even before the MDLEA 
was officially put in place.36 What’s more, this nexus requirement 
28 Fritch, supra note 17. 
29 See infra note 31. 
30 See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982), repealed by Maritime Drug Law En-  
forcement Act of 1986, 46 
U.S.C. app. §1903 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508 (2016)). 
31 Michael Tousley, United States Seizure of Stateless Drug Smuggling 
Vessels on the High Seas: Is it Legal, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 377 
(1990). 
32 See M. Lawrence Noyer, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955A 
of Title 21: Overextension of the Protective Principle of International 
Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 688, 689–90 (1982). 
3 3  Id.  
34 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 5 (“High seas, in maritime law, 
[includes] all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding the globe that are not 
part of the territorial sea or internal waters of a [S]tate.”). 
35 Tousley, supra note 31, at 377. 
3 6  Id.  
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arose where individuals are arrested on the high seas and not even 
within another State’s territorial waters.37 The former is often 
viewed by courts to afford more sovereignty to the arresting nation 
to handle the issue the way it deems fit.38  
The Fifth Circuit has addressed the MHSA and extraterritorial 
reach for drug–trafficking cases, determining appropriate bounda-
ries for asserting jurisdiction through a nexus requirement.39 For 
example, in United States v. Ricardo, the court addressed a case in 
which two Americans and five Colombians were arrested on board 
a vessel in the high seas for possession of marijuana and charged 
under a similar statute.40 Defendants argued that the jurisdiction 
cannot be asserted against them because there was no nexus to the 
United States.41 In other words, the Defendants’ actions did not 
have an intended effect in U.S. territory.42 The Fifth Circuit agreed, 
stating that “[t]he United States and this Circuit have traditionally 
adhered to the objective principle of territorial jurisdictional, which 
attaches criminal consequences to extraterritorial acts that are 
intended to have effect in the sovereign territory, at least where 
overt acts within the territory can be proved.”43 And wherever overt 
acts are not required, jurisdiction can be had upon a showing of 
intended territorial effects.44 In the Southern District of Florida, 
courts adopted the same perspective on extraterritorial reach in 
similar circumstances.45  
In United States. v. James–Robinson, for example, the court 
held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute 
foreign nationals on board a vessel 400 miles off the coast of the 
3 7 Id.  
3 8 Id.  
39 See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (5th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980). 
40 Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1127; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1979). 
41 Id. at 1128. 
4 2 Id.  
43 Id. (The court went on to find that the U.S. did have jurisdiction but because 
the nexus requirement was sufficiently met in this case). 
44 Id. (citing United States v. Postal, 580 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir. 1979)).  
45 See, e.g., infra note 46. 
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U.S. without a showing that defendants “caused, or intended to 
cause, some kind of effect in or to the U.S.”46  
The court in James–Robinson evaluated Congress’ intent be-
hind the MHSA and found that they expressed an intent to provide 
the government with “maximum prosecutorial authority” allowed 
by international law.47 The court also notes that the Department of 
Justice objected to the MHSA, stating that the lack of any provision 
requiring a showing a knowledge or intent to cause an effect in or 
to the U.S. 
“raises questions of criminal jurisdiction over for-
eign nationals and foreign vessels. Under interna-
tional law, a state does not have jurisdiction to pro-
scribe the conduct in question . . . To have jurisdic-
tion over . . . distribution of a controlled substance 
by a non–U.S. citizen on foreign vessels on the high 
seas, the United States must show an actual or po-
tential adverse effect within its territory.”48  
The bill was later amended, but no changes addressed the re-
quirement in question.49 Omitting this provision was immaterial, 
however, because Congress’ intent was for courts to exercise au-
thority within the boundaries of international law. 50 While the De-
partment of Justice raised its objections for potential violations of 
international law, there was no sign that Congress intended to reject 
the application of international law when implementing the 
MHSA.51 After all, the MHSA permitted intervention in drug 
smuggling and manufacturing where (1) the person is in the territo-
rial waters of the U.S.; (2) there is a U.S. citizen aboard any vessel 
on the high seas; or (3) the persons are aboard a vessel subject to 
46 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 
1981). 
47 Id. at 1343. 
48 Id. at 1343 (citing Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral (April 11, 1979), reprinted in H. R. REP. NO. 323 (1979)). 
49 Id. at 1343. 
50 See id.  
5 1 Id.  
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the jurisdiction of the U.S.52 Ultimately, this statute was abandoned 
because of the challenging burden of proving a vessel’s nationality 
in federal court.53 To remedy this adversity, the MDLEA was 
adopted to broaden the scope of prosecution, removing the 
requirement to prove vessel nationality.54  
C. The MDLEA: A Hawkish Effort to Prevent the Importation of 
Drugs into the U.S. 
By the mid–1980s, drug smuggling had hit an all–time high in 
the U.S. and other countries with an overwhelming majority of 
drugs coming from Latin America, including countries like Co-
lombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico.55 Consequently, cartels leading 
the charge in drug exportation had exhausted their aerial transpor-
tation and found relief in maritime smuggling.56 The U.S. faced 
effectively catching drug smugglers in the high seas, while com-
plying with customary international law.57 Specifically, “the high 
seas are open to all states, and no state may subject any part of 
them to its sovereignty.”58 By 1986, Congress fully adopted the 
MDLEA as the appropriate measures and abandoned all versions of 
the MHSA.59 The purpose of the MDLEA was to “facilitate en-
forcement by the U.S. Coast Guard of laws relating to the importa-  
52 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1982) (superseded by 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988)). 
53 Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug Enforcement Act: 
A Justification of the Law’s Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 113, 
200 (2017). 
54 See generally 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988). 
55 Bruce Bagley, The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in 
Latin America, 71 SOCIOLOGIA, PROBLEMAS E PRÁCTICAS 99, 102 (2013), 
https://journals.openedition.org/spp/1010 (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). (In 1985, 
Peru produced around sixty-five percent of the global market’s supply of coca 
leaf with Bolivia at twenty-five percent and Colombia at ten percent. Of course, 
with this concentration of drug supply coming from mostly Latin American 
countries, the U.S. was obligated to play a considerable role in mitigating this 
phenomenon. Consequently, the U.S. would need to create and define appropri-
ate laws to address the issue.). 
56 Latham, supra note 15, at 642. 
57 See generally id at 642–43. 
58 Id. (quoting R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 145 
(1983)). 
5 9  Id.  
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tion of illegal drugs and for other purposes.”60 Specifically, the 
MDLEA states the following: 
Congress finds and declares that (1) trafficking in 
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious in-
ternational problem, is universally condemned, and 
presents a specific threat to the security and societal 
well–being of the United States and (2) operating or 
embarking in a submersible vessel or semi– 
submersible vessel without nationality and on an in-
ternational voyage is a serious international prob-
lem, facilitates transnational crime, including drug 
trafficking, and terrorism, and presents a specific 
threat to the safety of maritime navigation and the 
security of the United States.61  
Important here, and at the heart of much controversy surround-
ing this statute, is the finding that international drug–trafficking 
presents a “specific threat to the security of the United States,” 
therefore assuming an automatic nexus between smuggling activi-
ties and the United States.62 But not all international drug– 
trafficking threatens the safety and security of the U.S. by default. 
Indeed, Congress intended to pass this statute to activate maximum 
prosecutorial authority but while still complying with international 
law.63 Thus, while Congress sought to take a strong initiative 
against drug importation, it cannot act beyond its enumerated pow-
ers under Article I of the Constitution nor did it intend to offend 
traditional notions of customary international law. 64 
III. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH ON  
THE HIGH SEAS 
While the focus of this article centers on the extraterritorial 
reach of the MDLEA as it applies particularly to arrests in a foreign 
territory, it is worth examining the arguments against prosecu-  
60 S. REP. 96-855, at 1 (1980). 
61 46 U.S.C. § 70501 (1986). 
6 2  Id.  
63 See Wald supra note 47. 
64 As for the latter, intent is irrelevant. 
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tion based on acts committed in the high seas. Courts have been 
willing to gloss over an analysis of the jurisdiction for arrests made 
on the high seas.65 Thus, it is worth analyzing the primary sources 
of customary international law, the types of jurisdiction States may 
assert under such law, and the existing treaties between the U.S. 
and Latin American nations. Such analysis shows that even arrests 
made for drug–trafficking on the high seas, rather than foreign ter-
ritorial waters, without a valid nexus to the U.S. are improper to 
prosecute. 
A. Setting the Stage with the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) serves as a primary source for guidance in the area of 
admiralty law for many States.66 Its contents outline a wide breadth 
of generally forbidden practices overseas, State sovereign and 
jurisdictional limits, rights of foreign vessels and ships, and so on.67 
The U.S. helped with the creation of the UNCLOS, which was later 
ratified by 162 countries and the European Union.68 That said, 
while the U.S. spearheaded its creation and implementation, 
Congress has yet to ratify and sign into the Treaty, citing issues 
with seabed mining and delegating too much authority to adversar-
ial countries.69 Yet multiple presidents and congressional reports 
have asserted the U.S. intent to abide by the UNCLOS and courts 
have even cited its contents when determining best practices or 
violations of customary international law.70 Moreover, because an 
overwhelming amount of nations have already signed the Treaty 
governing the UNCLOS into action, it ought to be considered cus-
tomary international law regardless of U.S. approval or involve-  
65 See, e.g., infra notes 86–87. 
66 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397. 
67 See id.  
68 Aditya Singh Verma, A Case for the Unites States’ Ratification of 
UNCLOS, (May 2, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://diplomatist.com/2020/05/02/a-case-
for-the-united-states-ratification-of-unclos/.  
6 9 Id.  
70 Id.; See, e.g., United States v. Aybar-Ulloa, 987 F.3d 1, 6 (relying on 
UNCLOS to determine customary international law). 
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ment.71 Contained within the UNCLOS is the right for a vessel to 
travel through high seas with minimal interference from other 
states, while duties for such vessel include sailing under the flag of 
their corresponding States.72  
Under the rules of international law, the Coast Guard may not 
stop or even board foreign vessels when such vessels are navigating 
the high seas or even in foreign waters.73 To bypass this limitation, 
the U.S. has launched several bilateral agreements with nations in 
Latin America and the Caribbean allowing the U.S. Coast Guard to 
board and search other States’ vessels when those vessels are 
suspected of drug trafficking.74 These are not made in under any 
UNCLOS rules and are, instead, only agreements made between the 
U.S. and other countries laid out for specific scenari-os.75 Rarely, if 
ever, do these arguments mention any instances of a nation’s ability 
to prosecute extraterritorially.76 Moreover, consent to prosecute in 
these cases does not provide valid grounds for jurisdiction where 
the activities have no connection to the prosecuting nation.77 
Jurisdiction, in such instance, would only be valid if the activities 
occurred within territorial waters of the prosecuting nation or if 
there were universal jurisdiction.78  
B. The Five Types of Jurisdiction under Customary International 
Law 
In general, there are five methods in which States can assert ju-
risdiction: (1) nationality principle; (2) passive personality princi-
ple; (3) territorial principles; (4) protective principle; and (5) uni-  
71 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110–9 (2007). 
72 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, 89, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
73 Id. at art. 110. 
74 Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumer-
ated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction Over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1191, 1202 (2009). 
7 5  Id.  
7 6  Id.  
77 See, e.g., infra note 81. 
7 8 See id.  
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versal principle.79 The first four require a nexus to the prosecution 
nation. 80 For purposes of this casenote, the three main principles to 
be discussed are territorial, protective, and universal. Under the 
territorial principle, “a state may exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
all persons or things within its territory.”81 Thus, under this 
principle, vessels on the high seas maintain the nationality of the 
flag they fly and are subject to such nation’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion—not that of the arresting nation. 82 When a State relies on pro-
tective jurisdiction or asserts the “protective principle,” over an act 
committed outside the State’s territory, the act or conduct must 
“threaten[] the nation’s security or could potentially interfere with 
the operation of governmental functions.”83 Courts in the Eleventh 
Circuit relied on the protective principle as a justification for the 
MHSA and, later, the MDLEA.84 In United States v. Gonzalez, the 
court reasoned that the MHSA had been adopted to rely on the pro-
tective principle because proving that a vessel was headed for the 
United states is “often difficult.”85 The court also relied on Con-
gress’ finding that drug–trafficking in these areas have a potential 
harm and are recognized as crimes by other developed nations. 86 
i. The Protective Principle Fails to Justify the MDLEA’s 
Extraterritorial Reach on the High Seas 
On the other hand, the Southern District of Texas addressed an 
issue under the MDLEA in which the defendant was neither a U.S. 
citizen nor had ever been to the U.S., and whose acts did not seem 
79 Allyson Bennett, Note, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal 
Jurisdiction, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT’L. 
L. 433, 436 (2012). 
8 0  Id.  
81 United States v. Marcano-Godoy, 462 F. Supp. 3d 88, 95. (D.P.R. 2020) 
(internal citations omitted). 
82 United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980). 
83 United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985).  
84 Id. at 939 (addressing arrests made on the high seas specifically); see infra 
note 88. 
85 776 F.2d at 939. 
8 6  Id.  
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to have an effect on the U.S. because he was destined for Europe.87 
The district court found a lack of jurisdiction under the protective 
principle and asserted that there was no nexus here.88 To support its 
argument, they offered that the protective principle is only activated 
when conduct by foreign nationals are directed against the “security 
of the state or against a limited class of other state inter-ests.”89 
Indeed, the district court’s opinion was vacated by the Fifth Circuit 
because drug–trafficking automatically “threatens the security of 
the United States.”90 Even so, these assumptions are rarely, if ever, 
challenged even though it is warranted. For example, the court in 
Suerte relied heavily on a Congressional finding that “trafficking in 
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international 
problem and is universally condemned[, and] . . . presents a specific 
threat to the security . . . of the United States.’”91 As shown here, 
the phrase “trafficking in” assumes that the act includes bringing 
drugs “in” the U.S.92  
Moreover, the logic applied in Suerte to the congressional find-
ing has no boundaries.93 Nothing in the congressional finding 
would prevent the U.S. from prosecuting cases that occurred twen-
ty–five miles off an Australian coast or in any other part of the 
world isolated from the U.S.94 Judge Torruella of the First Circuit 
phrased it well when he contended that “[r]elying on the protective 
principle without any nexus would be to conclude that Congress 
could allow for arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers on the 
other side of the world, even without flag–nation consent.”95 Sure-
ly, there is no connection inherent in drug smuggling conducted in 
these areas and the safety and security of the U.S.96 Thus, justify-  
87 See United States v. Suerte, No. CRIM. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264 (S.D. 
Tex. June 6, 2001) (vacated by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 
2002)). 
88 See id. at *6. 
89 Id. at *5 (citing Restatement (Third) at § 402(3)). 
90 Suerte, 291 F.3d at 371. 
91 Id. at 370 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902) (emphasis added).  
9 2 Id.  
93 See id.  
94 See id.  
95 United States v. Angulo-Hernández, 576 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(Torruela, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review). 
96 See generally id. 
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ing jurisdiction for drug–trafficking on the high seas on the grounds 
of the protective principle ought to be re–evaluated. 
ii. Universal Jurisdiction Does Not Apply to Arrests Made on 
the High Seas 
Where arrests are made for drug–trafficking on the high seas, 
the U.S. would still not be able to prosecute under the guise of the 
last principle mentioned above, universal jurisdiction.97 Examples 
of crime which would constitute a universal crime or possess char-
acteristics found to impose “universal concern” include piracy, 
slavery, and genocide.98 When a universal crime is committed, a 
nation may then exercise universal jurisdiction no matter where the 
act occurred or whether the act had any nexus to the nation. Com-
paring these types of crimes to drug–smuggling is futile. While 
drug abuse is a serious issue that warrants combative responses, it 
cannot be placed on the same level as mass–killings or forced labor. 
Simply put, drug trafficking is not a universal crime consistent with 
customary international law and should not be recognized as such.99 
For that reason, courts should not accept a universal jurisdiction 
argument for arrests made on the high seas. 
IV. MURKY WATERS: EXTRA–TERRITORIAL REACH IN FOREIGN 
TERRITORIAL WATERS 
The primary focus of the debate in lower courts has geared 
around extraterritorial reach in foreign territorial waters.100 Thus, 
the attention of this note will now shift to arrests made in foreign 
territorial seas. To support the contention that extraterritorial arrests 
are improper, this section will focus on those Latin American 
countries that oppose this type of invasion on their sovereignty. 
Next, this section will include background on the Offences Clause 
and Foreign Commerce Clause, and an analysis for both as applied 
to the MDLEA. 
Congress has exceeded its authority by exerting jurisdiction 
beyond the reach of the U.S. and such acts are unconstitutional 
97 Infra note 98. 
98 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rel. L. §§ 402 cmt. F (1987). 
9 9  Id.  
100 See generally supra note 10. 
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under the Offences and Foreign Commerce. As such, two main 
constitutional provisions are at issue: the Foreign Commerce Clause 
under Article I Section 8, Clause 3, and the Offences Clause101 
under Article I Section 8, Clause 10. The Foreign Commerce 
Clause states that Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”102 Under the Offences Clause, Congress has the 
power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”103 Both 
have been and are continuously used as a basis to assert ex-
traterritorial reach.104  
Many argue that the Offences Clause grants Congress sweeping 
authority to essentially define international law violations and 
impose punishments for those violations.105 Some courts, particularly 
the Ninth Circuit, have taken a liking to this position and applied it to 
the MDLEA.106 Under the strict lens of constitutionality, this seems 
to be an accurate interpretation of the clause.107 Congress, under the 
Offences Clause, has the authority to determine what international 
law violations would be.108 At any rate, this in-  
101 Many courts refer to this particular section as the “Piracies and Felonies” 
clause. While arguments have been made for and against the MDLEA’s extrater-
ritorial reach using this clause, this analysis will center around the “Offences” 
clause. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; for purposes of this case note, the “Offenc-
es Clause” will encompass both Congress’ power to define and punish felonies 
on the high seas and Offences against the law of nations. 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Cifuentes-Cuero, 808 F. App’x 771, 775 (11th 
Cir. 2020) (relying on Felonies portion of Offences Tripartite Clause); see also 
United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 667–69 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying For-
eign Commerce Clause to justify extraterritorial reach of human trafficking con-
duct). 
105 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s 
Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000) (discussing the underappreciated authority that 
the framers of the Constitution granted to Congress and how the courts neglect 
this as a topic). 
106 See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(reasoning that the MDLEA is constitutional under the Piracies and Felonies 
Clause). 
107 Cifuentes-Cureo, 808 F. App’x at 775. 
108 Id.  
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terpretation raises serious issues in application by permitting the 
exercising of such broad powers worldwide. On the other hand, 
specific portions of the MDLEA have already been narrowed by 
some Circuit courts, as made evident by the Eleventh Circuit.109 
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that the broad author-
ity granted to the Executive by the MDLEA as an improper exercise 
of the Offences Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause as well as a 
violation of the Due Process Clause.110 The court in Davila– 
Mendoza primarily addressed the nexus argument, being that the 
U.S. cannot prosecute drug smugglers found in another State’s ter-
ritory where there is connection between their activities and the 
U.S.111 And while this case once puts the Eleventh Circuit against 
the extraterritorial reach overseas permitted by the MDLEA, the 
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, still leaving open the 
feasibility and authorization to enforce the statute.112  
A. Latin American Sentiments on U.S. Exercise of Extra– 
Territorial Control 
Before delving into a legal analysis under the Offences and 
Foreign Commerce Clauses, it is worth looking into foreign States’ 
sentiments toward U.S. intervention and prosecution of conduct 
beyond its territory. Particularly relevant for these purposes is the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substance,113 which will be examined throughout 
this section for its assertions, declarations, and objections by 
signatory States. 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (finding that Congress is limited, by customary international law, in 
punishing crimes that are not deemed violations of the law of nations); but see 
United States v. Ruiz-Murillo, 736 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2018) (ac-
knowledging the holding in Bellaizac-Hurtado, but contending such limitation 
does not apply where an arrest was made beyond the twelve-mile territorial wa-
ters of a foreign state). 
110 United States. v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020). 
111 Id. at 1276. 
112 Id.  
113 Infra note 114. 
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i. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substance—A Case Against Prosecuting 
Conduct Outside Territorial Reach 
After the passing of the MDLEA, dozens of countries came to-
gether and established the United Nations Convention Against Il-
licit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (the 
“Treaty”).114 The UN sets out the objective of the Treaty as 
“provid[ing] comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, 
including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of 
precursor chemicals. It provides for international cooperation 
through, for example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled 
delivers and transfer of proceedings.”115 Additionally, the contents 
of the Treaty expresses concerns of illicit drug use and the rising 
trend of drug production, as well as the UN’s desire to combat it 
head–on.116 Nonetheless, the Treaty still maintains that it is “ 
[d]etermined to improve international co–operation in the suppres-
sion of illicit traffic by sea . . . [r]ecognizing that eradication of 
illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of all States and that, to 
that end, coordinated action within the framework of international 
co–operation is necessary.”117 Although the United States has rati-
fied this Treaty, it is important to note that because the MDLEA 
was passed before ratification, the statute cannot be interpreted in 
light of the Treaty.118 As a result, it cannot be argued that the 
drafters of the MDLEA were putting it into law to comply with an 
existing treaty to overcome objections on grounds of constitutional 
law. 
Multiple Latin American countries have ratified the Treaty, but 
with reservation and objection.119 Most glaring is that of Mexico. 
114 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493. 
115 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/illicit-trafficking.html?ref=menuside 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2021). 
116 See Treaty supra, note 114. 
117 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
118 See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) 
(2021). 
119 See, e.g., infra note 120. 
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Mexico objected to the United States third declaration. First, the 
United States’ third declaration read as follows: 
(3) Pursuant to the rights of the United States under 
article 7 of this treaty to deny requests which preju-
dice its essential interests, the United States shall 
deny a request for assistance when the designated 
authority, after consultation with all appropriate in-
telligence, anti–narcotic, and foreign policy agen-
cies, has specific information that a senior govern-
ment official who will have access to information to 
be provided under this treaty is engaged in or facili-
tates the production or distribution of illegal 
drugs.120  
Mexico viewed this as a “unilateral claim to justification . . . 
which runs counter to the purposes of the [Treaty].”121 Article 7 
lays out the guidelines for mutual legal assistance and requires par-
ties to afford one another the “widest measure of mutual legal as-
sistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in 
relations to criminal offences . . .”122 The reason the U.S. declara-
tion is problematic is that the refusal to co–operate under Article 7 
will hinder and deter other countries’ efforts to prosecute drug– 
trafficking offenses committed within their jurisdiction, especially 
when the U.S. makes the initial arrest.123 Operating under the U.S. 
declaration, whenever it makes the finding that a government offi-
cial privy to the disclosed information is somehow in cahoots with 
the drug–trafficking activities, the U.S. can then refuse to aid in any 
investigation or proceeding. Without disclosure of where the arrest 
was made, what individuals were on a vessel, or what those 
individuals disclosed in interviews, it becomes nearly impossible to 
bring proceedings anywhere but the U.S. As such, the U.S. holds a 
monopoly over prosecutions for drug–trafficking offenses. 
120 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Dec. 20, 
1988), sa. 
121 Id.  
122  Id.  
123 See id.  
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ii. U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Latin 
American Nations 
The Treaty also provides that other mutual legal assistance 
agreements may be entered into notwithstanding Article 7.124 The 
United States has entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs) with nineteen countries, only six of which are Latin 
American countries—Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Mexico Panama, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.125 These treaties tend to focus on the help 
of identifying, capturing, and aiding in the prosecution of per-
sons.126 For example, in an MLAT with Brazil, assistance explicitly 
includes: (a) taking the testimony or states of persons; (b) providing 
documents, records, and items; . . . (f) executing requests for 
searches and seizures; . .. and (h) any other form of assistance not 
prohibited by the laws of the Requested State.127 Thus, even where 
there may be some sort of agreement over cooperation and 
jurisdiction, the requested state must abide by its own laws. 
B. Treatment of MDLEA by Davila–Mendoza and a Forecast for 
Future Decisions on the Extraterritorial Reach of the MDLEA 
in Foreign Territorial Waters 
The Eleventh Circuit took initiative to consider the MDLEA 
unconstitutional in United States v. Davila–Mendoza.128 The de-
fendants in Davila–Mendoza consisted of three foreign nationals in 
a foreign vessel who were seized and boarded by U.S. Coast Guard 
officers in the territorial waters of Jamaica. 129 The officers discov-  
124 Id.  
125 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and L. Enf’t Aff., 2012 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Mar. 7, 2012); see 
also Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, FINDLAW, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/j/inl/rl s/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) 
(explaining that only three Latin American countries have an MLAT currently in 
force). 
126 See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of Ameri-  
ca and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Braz.- U.S., Oct. 14, 1997, S. TREATY DOC NO. 
105-42. 
127 Id. at art. 1. 
128 United States v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020). 
129 Id. at 1267. 
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ered 3,500 kilograms of baled marijuana on the vessel.130 The cap-
tain of the smuggling vessel disclosed to the officers that the vessel 
was Costa Rican and that he was Nicaraguan. 131 Subsequently, the 
defendants freely admitted to the crime and explained that the en-
gines had stopped working on the boat from the weight of the drugs 
on board.132 The defendants were charged with possessing and 
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 1,000 kilograms 
of marijuana under the MDLEA.133 The defendants moved to 
dismiss, alleging the statute exceeded Congress’ power under the 
Define and Punish Clause and asserted that the district court’s 
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction violated their due process 
rights.134 In response, the government contended that the extraterri-
torial application of the MDLEA was valid under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause. 135 
The court first looked to the Tripartite Clause—Congress’ 
power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”136 The 
government’s argument was quickly dismissed because this arrest 
occurred in the territorial waters of Jamaica, not on the high seas.137 
Additionally, the “Offences against the Law of Nations” component 
was rejected under stare decisis as the Eleventh Circuit has 
determined that the clause’s application is “limited to those 
offenses recognized by customary international law.”138  
The court next evaluated a portion of Article I, which may have 
authorized the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach: the Foreign Com-
merce Clause.139 As mentioned earlier, the Constitution provides 
that “Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1), 70503(b)). 
134 Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1268. 
135 See id. The government also argued that the application would fall under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
137 Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1268. 
138 Id. (citing United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249–53 
(11th Cir. 2012) (holding the MDLEA unconstitutional under the Offences 
Clause)). 
139 972 F.3d at 1268. 
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with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”140 While the court recognized the Foreign Com-
merce Clause’s broad power afforded to the clause by the Supreme 
Court, it also pointed out the Supreme Court’s lack of explicitly 
defined boundaries.141 The court reasoned that Congress’ power 
under the Foreign Commerce Clause “includes at least the power to 
regulate channels of commerce between the United States and other 
countries, the ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce between the United 
States and other countries, and activities that have a substantial 
effect” on commerce between the United States and other 
countries.”142 Thus, under a Foreign Commerce Clause analysis it 
was treated as necessary to embark on a nexus determination 
through the “substantial affects” test.143 The court found the gov-
ernment’s logic as permitting Congress to “globally polic[e]” for-
eign drug trafficking commerce, invading the sovereignty of other 
foreign nations without the U.S. being involved in any capacity.144 
The court found that the MDLEA is unconstitutional and exceeded 
Congress’ authority under the Foreign Commerce, Offences (a.k.a. 
“Define and Punish”), and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 145 
This case is groundbreaking because it breaks away from the 
position the Eleventh Circuit held for over a decade. 146 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Estupinan, the court found that the lower 
court did not err in failing to sua sponte find that Congress exceeded 
its authority under the Piracies and Felonies Clause by enacting the 
MDLEA.147 First, it reasoned that the MDLEA was put in 
140 US CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 3. 
141 Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1269–70. 
142 Id. (quoting United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016)).  
143 See Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d. at 1272–74 (reasoning that it needed not 
determine necessarily that the activities substantially affected interstate com-
merce, but only that a “rational basis” existed for concluding such). 
144 Id. at 1276–77. 
145 Id. at 1277–78. 
146 See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir. 
1985) (rendering extraterritorial prosecution under the MHSA permissible under 
the protective principle of international law); United States v. Campbell, 743 
F.3d 802, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that established precedent permit-
ted extraterritorial prosecution on the high seas under the Offences Clause, even 
where the conduct lacked a nexus to the U.S.; see generally United States v. 
Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006). 
147 Estupinan, 453 F.3d at 1338. 
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place specifically to punish acts committed on the high seas based 
on the statute acknowledging that drug trafficking is an interna-
tional problem and is a “threat to the security and societal well– 
being of the United States.”148 Additionally, the court explained 
there was a lack of cases that applied the nexus requirement be-
tween acts committed and the U.S.149 Still, this rationale becomes 
problematic because it lacks substantial, thorough analysis. 150 The 
MDLEA does not only apply to acts committed on the high seas, 
but just as the MDLEA makes clear, and just as it has been applied, 
the U.S. may punish acts committed anywhere outside its territory, 
not just the high seas.151 It is also not entirely clear whether the 
MDLEA would be constitutionally viable even if its scope were 
restricted to solely arrests made for criminal conduct on the high 
seas, as argued earlier. 152 
i. The Offences Clause of the Constitution in Maritime Law 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations.”153 This Clause serves as a 
positive authority being afforded to the Legislature rather than a 
limitation like the Due Process Clause. 154 Even so, this should not be 
mistaken as unilateral authority to establish the boundaries of the 
Law of Nations and dictate what acts constitute a crime as a matter of 
international law. Before the Constitution was ratified and adopted as 
the supreme law of the land, admiralty and maritime cases were split 
between the Confederation and the States.155 The Framers’ purpose 
of setting forth that clause in the Constitution was to transfer the 
power to Congress to decide the legality of certain acts under 
admiralty law, of course within the proper boundaries.156 Thus, in 
defining offenses against the law of nations 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 See id. 
151 46 U.S.C. § 70503(b) (2016). 
152 Id.  
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
155 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 147 (1933). 
156 Id.  
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Congress sets out penalties and crimes that resemble already exist-
ing customary international law, it lacks the authority to single– 
handedly establish international standards for the rest of the world 
to follow. 157 
In United States v. Flores, the appellant was a U.S. citizen ac-
cused of murdering another U.S. citizen while in the territorial wa-
ters of the Belgian Congo, which was subject to the sovereignty of 
the Kingdom of Belgium. 158 The appellee was brought to the Port 
of Philadelphia following the crime and was tried in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.159 The main issue to be resolved was 
“whether the jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases . . . 
extends to the punishment of crimes committed on vessels of the 
United States while in foreign waters.”160 The Court looked to 
English courts in the past, as well as existing common law, to rea-
son—and emphasize—that jurisdiction is not only restricted to 
vessels within territorial waters, but follows its ships on the high 
seas and in extraterritorial jurisdictions.161 Thus, the Court found 
that the U.S. may define and punish crimes committed by U.S. citi-
zens on U.S. vessels while within foreign waters where the sover-
eign has not elected to assert its jurisdiction.162 It also noted that 
courts have a duty to apply their own statutes, interpreted in the 
light of recognized principles of international law, to offenses 
committed by their own citizens. 163 
That said, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Flores inter-
preted a limit on the congressional authority vested by the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.164 In United States v. Bellaizac–Hurtado, the 
court held that the MDLEA exceeded Congress’s authority under 
the Offences Clause, as it applied to extraterritorial drug trafficking 
of foreign nationals on foreign vessels.165 The court listed two rea-
sons: (1) customary international law limits Congress’ power to 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 144–45. 
159 Id. at 145. 
160 Id. at 150. 
161 Flores, 289 U.S. at 150–51. 
162 Id. at 159. 
163 Id.  
164 See generally id. 
165 United States v. Belliazac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
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define and punish crimes pursuant to the Offences Clause; and (2) 
drug trafficking is not recognized as a universal crime and thus 
does not violate customary international law.166 Additionally, it 
found that “‘Offences Against the Law of Nations is Synonymous’ 
With Violations of Customary International Law.”167 Consequently, 
an analysis of customary international law is part of an analysis of 
constitutionality under the Offences Clause.168  
ii. The MDLEA is not Justified Under the Offences Clause of 
the Constitution 
Because drug–trafficking is generally not recognized as a uni-
versal crime under customary international law, the U.S. cannot 
unilaterally prosecute this conduct under the Offences Clause.169 
One way in which customary international law would permit juris-
diction is under universal jurisdiction. 170 Generally, the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction permits a nation to “prosecute certain serious 
international offenses even though it has no connection to the con-
duct or participants.”171 In any event, as mentioned earlier the uni-
versal jurisdiction doctrine would not apply because drug– 
smuggling does not constitute a universal crime like slavery or 
genocide.172 The court in Bellaizac–Hurtado agreed with this notion 
and asserted that the international community and legal scholars 
alike have refused to treat drug trafficking as a violation of con-
temporary customary international law.173 And while the govern-
ment argued that “widespread ratification of the 1988 [UN] Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic 
Substances establishes that drug trafficking violates a norm of cus-
tomary international law,”174 their argument fails as courts must 
166 Id. at 1253. 
167 Id. at 1251. 
168 See id.  
169 See generally U.N. Office on Drug and Crime, supra note 115. 
170 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 73. 
171 Kontorovich, supra note 74. 
172 Supra note 98. 
173 See United States v. Balliazac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
174 Id. at 1255. 
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look beyond treaty ratification and into actual state practice.175 
Although the aforementioned convention has 188 State parties, 
several of those States have failed to comply with its restrictions 
over a sheer unwillingness; this practice suggests that drug traf-
ficking has not reached the threshold of a customary international 
law violation.176 As a result, the court held that Congress exceeded 
its power under the Offences clause when it prosecuted the defend-
ants’ conduct in Panama’s territorial waters.177  
Indeed, it is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit that “Congress 
[cannot] create an international felony of drug trafficking.”178 This 
makes an analysis under the Offences Clause, or really any part of 
the Tripartite Clause, brief and straightforward.179 Drug– trafficking 
is simply not conduct which the U.S. can assert control over in 
foreign territory. Such acts do not violate any well–settled 
customary international law, and thus cannot be categorized as an 
Offense against the Law of Nations.180 Some may argue that the 
Protective Principle would permit jurisdiction. Yet this would chal-
lenge whether the conduct has a nexus to the safety and security of 
the U.S. or somehow interferes with its governmental functions.181 
While drug–trafficking does not per se constitute a nexus to the 
U.S., this contention has been discussed under a high seas analysis, 
and will now be evaluated under the context of the Foreign Com-
merce Clause.182  
175 See id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Ger. 
V. Den.; Fed. Republic of Ger. V. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20)). 
176 See Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1255; see also John David Michels, 
Keeping Dealers Off the Docket: The Perils of Prosecuting Serious Drug-Related 
Offences at the International Criminal Court, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2009) 
(referring to the drafters of the Rome Statute who rejected a proposal to consider 
drug trafficking a crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court). 
177 Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1258. 
178 United States v. Oliveros-Estupinan, 544 F. App’x. 930, 931 (11th Cir. 
2014) (citing Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1245). 
179  Id.  
180 See supra note 98. 
181 See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (5th Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 43 S. Ct. 39, 41 (1922); American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 29 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1909). 
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C. The Background and Development of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause 
The Foreign Commerce Clause can be interpreted to provide 
broad authority, “an unbound reading of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause allows the federal government to intrude on the sovereignty 
of other nations—just as a broad reading of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause allows it to intrude on the sovereignty of the 
States.”183 This section will explain the Foreign Commerce Clause 
and how its boundaries are equated with the well–known Interstate 
Commerce Clause by lower courts. The Foreign Commerce Clause 
does not permit extraterritorial prosecution of drug–trafficking in 
foreign territorial waters. 
i. The Foreign Commerce Clause in General 
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress has the power 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”184 This Clause is 
closely mirrored by the highly scrutinized Interstate Commerce 
Clause.185 Mainly, the mutual ground between these two Clauses is 
their nexus requirement, or commonly known in Interstate Com-
merce precedent as the substantial effect rule.186 But a key differ-
ence is that the Foreign Commerce Clause has garnered little atten-
tion and its powers have scarcely been reviewed by the federal 
courts.187 Yet this is an increasingly important area to be explored, 
especially as it applies to the thousands of alleged smugglers that 
have been, and continue to be, arrested extraterritorially by the U.S. 
188 
183 United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United 
States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
185 See Baston, 818 F.3d at 668 (assuming, for purposes of analysis, that the  
Foreign Commerce Clause carries the same scope as the Interstate Commerce 
Clause). 
186 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. 1 (1824); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (finding that a 
“substantial effect” must be an economic effect). 
187 See United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1197 (10th Cir. 2018). 
188 Wessler, supra note 1. 
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ii. Interstate Commerce Clause in General 
The Interstate Commerce Clause derives from Article I of the 
Constitution, “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”189 In 1824, the Clause was explained by the 
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, when the Court said, “[t]he power 
given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
between the Several states, relates to commerce, in the proper ac-
ceptation of the term; ‘the exchange of one thing for another; the 
interchange of commodities; trade or traffic.’”190 Commerce de-
scribes the “commercial intercourse between nations . . . and is 
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”191 
Regulation of commerce evolved since the 19th century and the 
Court has established three separate categories of regulation under 
the Constitution.192 Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Con-
gress can do the following: (1) regulate channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) regulate and protect instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce as well as the persons or things within; and regulate (3) 
“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”193  
iii. The Extraterritorial Reach of MDLEA is Not Justified 
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause 
“Congress has broad power under [the Foreign Commerce 
Clause], ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations,’ and this 
court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to 
persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries where United 
States interests are affected.”194 The Foreign Commerce Clause, in 
its few uses, has been used as a basis to excuse extraterritorial reach 
successfully.195 In any event, deliberate inclusion of an effects 
requirement for extraterritorial reach in the late Justice Scal-  
189 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (emphasis added). 
190 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 89. 
191 Id. at 72. 
192 See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
193 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
194 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909). 
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ia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Company speaks vol-
umes.196 While prosecuting criminal activities beyond territorial 
boundaries is acceptable under some circumstances, the clear, un-
ambiguous line must be drawn where activities do adversely affect 
against the U.S. 197 
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Circuit 
considered an instance of extraterritorial jurisdiction over sex– 
trafficking acts constitutional.198 In United States v. Baston, the 
defendant was a convicted international sex trafficker.199 The gov-
ernment had filed a cross–appeal over the district court’s refusal to 
award restitution to a victim of sex trafficking in Australia on the 
grounds that it would exceed the power of Congress under the For-
eign Commerce Clause.200 In its reasoning, the Baston court as-
sumed that “the Foreign Commerce Clause included at least the 
power to regulate the ‘channels’ of commerce between the United 
States and other countries, the ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce 
between the United  
States and other countries, and activities that have a ‘substantial 
effect’ on commerce between the United States and other Coun-
tries.”201 The court deemed Section 1596(a)(2)—the statute on ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction over certain trafficking offenses— 
constitutional at least as a “regulation of activities that have a ‘sub-
stantial effect’ on foreign commerce,” and that Congress had a ra-
tional basis to place those acts in “‘an economic class of activities 
that have a substantial effect on . . . commerce.’”202 Human traf-
ficking is distinct from drug–trafficking. Human trafficking is a 
modern form of slavery and is the largest manifestation of slavery 
today.203 Drug use, while no doubt problematic, cannot and should 
not be equated to human–trafficking, slavery, or genocide for pur-  
196 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1). 
197 See id. 
198 United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016). 
199 Id. at 656. 
200 Id. at 657. 
201 Id. at 668. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)). 
202  Id.  
203 Karen E. Bravo, The Role of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in Contempo-  
rary Anti-Human Trafficking Discourse, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 555, 555–56 
(2011). 
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poses of establishing a nexus.204 Thus, when viewing drug– 
trafficking conduct as a whole, it does not fall squarely within a 
categorical net for a nexus to exist. 205 
The Supreme Court in Baston, had a chance to address the 
boundaries of the Foreign Commerce Clause and eliminate the need 
to operate under assumptions in its comparison to the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. The Court, however, rejected writ and tabled 
this controversy for another day.206 Still, Justice Thomas took to a 
lengthy dissent arguing that the issue for setting the limits for the 
Foreign Commerce Clause is ripe and that the Court should have 
granted certiorari.207 Justice Thomas explains the following: 
[w]ithout guidance from this Court as to the proper 
scope of Congress’ power under [the Foreign 
Commerce] Clause, the court of appeals have con-
strued it expansively, to permit Congress to regulate 
economic activity abroad if it has a substantial effect 
on this Nation’s foreign commerce . . . We should 
grant certiorari and reaffirm that our Federal 
Government is one of limited and enumerated pow-
ers, not the world’s lawgiver.208  
If this is any indicator as to the outcome of an inevitable Su-
preme Court ruling, it seems that Congress has gone beyond its 
bounds in authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
MDLEA.209 Lower courts have been much too quick to find a nexus 
automatically where one simply does not exist based on con-
gressional findings and a loose rationale.210 For example, Justice 
Thomas looks to United States v. Bollinger,211 where the Fourth 
Circuit held that the Foreign Commerce Clause permits Congress to 
regulate activities that “demonstrably” affect foreign commerce, 
rather than require the more rigorous test of showing a “substan-  
204 Id. at 556. 
205 See generally id. 
206 See Baston v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 850 (2017) (certiorari denied). 
207 Id. at 851–53. 
208 Id. at 851. 
209 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2011). 
210 See, e.g., Baston, 137 S. Ct. at 850. 
211 Id. at 853. 
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tial” effect.212 Moreover, Justice Thomas’s dissent suggests that 
the current nexus test is far too lenient and strays away from the 
legitimate purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause; to restrict 
congressional power.213 It is not even explicitly clear, from the 
Court’s language in past precedent, whether the Foreign Com-
merce Clause is at least as powerful as the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.214  
Thus, there are clear arguments to place the MDLEA’s extra-
territorial reach beyond the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 
as appellate courts interpret it.215 Perhaps the Court takes on this 
issue soon to resolve any confusion. The outcome would likely be a 
tightening of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s reach.216 That said, 
regardless of the outcome it seems that the MDLEA’s demise as it 
pertains to the Foreign Commerce Clause is inevitable and only a 
matter of time.217  
V .  C O N C L U S I O N  
In sum, it is difficult to justify the MDLEA on constitutional or 
international law grounds. While it was understandably enacted as a 
tough reaction to a growing and pressing problem in the U.S., 
Congress has overreached in its attempts to combat drug abuse. 
Thus, the U.S. has mitigated Latin American States’ sovereignty by 
prosecuting conduct which occurred in their own territory. Some 
Latin American States have voiced concern and hesitancy about 
permitting this sort of behavior. Despite those who do con-  
212 United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 215 (4th Cir. 2015). 
213 Baston, 137 S. Ct. at 852 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am concerned that 
language in some of this Court’s precedents has led the courts of appeals into 
error. At the very least, the time has come for us to clarify the scope of Con-
gress’ power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to regulate extraterritorial-
ly.”). 
214 Id. at 852–53 (“[T]he court of appeals have taken the modern interstate 
commerce doctrine and assumed that the foreign commerce power is at least as 
broad. The result is a doctrine justified neither by our precedents nor by the 
original understanding.”). 
215 See, e.g., United States. v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 
2020). 
216 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993). 
217 See generally Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264. 
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sent, this sort of extraterritorial reach over Latin American States 
must be analyzed by the Court to aid in a future decision that may 
stretch even beyond drug smuggling cases. 
Indeed, it has taken time for courts to acknowledge the overex-
tension, for circuits that have, but there are still some that remain 
unconvinced of any issues with the MDLEA’s jurisdictional 
boundaries.218 In light of the scattered circuit court rulings, the Su-
preme Court will no doubt need to address this issue. When that 
time comes, the Supreme Court must give lower courts guidance on 
both the Foreign Commerce and Offences Clause and their ap-
plication to drug–smuggling and prosecution of other conduct be-
yond U.S. territory. Perhaps, Davila–Mendoza will provide the 
proper posture for the Court to decide on the issue explicitly, once 
and for all. 
218 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Van Der End, 943 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2019). 
